East Asia has enormous scope to upgrade and integrate its financial markets, covering the spectrum of equity, bond, foreignexchange, and derivatives markets. Financial markets and institutions in East Asia tend to be narrow and undeveloped, although there are important exceptions. Japan dominates the top tier of the region's markets by virtue of its size, but its markets are not advanced, and many of its private institutions are weak. Although the markets in Australia, Hong Kong SAR, and Singapore are smaller than those of Japan, they are more innovative, marketoriented, and technologically advanced. Markets in Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand have made substantial progress to varying degrees; but China, Indonesia, and the Philippines have a considerable way to go in developing the information and governance infrastructure that financial markets need to function well. For all these countries, there is a clear role for regional cooperation among policymakers in building capacity in, and links between, financial markets in East Asia, as well as in encouraging stable speculation and the participation of nonresident and institutional investors in domestic financial markets. ASEAN+3 is an important and welcome advance in regional cooperation, but its membership does not span the depth of experience in financial markets and institutions that exists in East Asia.
Financial markets after the East Asian crisis
East Asia has experienced severe economic shocks in the past decade, and it faces many new challenges. In general the region's ªnancial markets are relatively weak, narrow, and undeveloped, although there are exceptions, notably those in Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong SAR, and Australia. Not only are the banking sectors of some of the crisis-affected economies still heavily burdened by the fallout from the ªnancial crises of 1997 and 1998, but most banks in China and Japan are overwhelmed by nonperforming loans (NPLs). Financial integration in East Asia is still in its infancy.
This has a bearing on the economic outlook of the region. Weak ªnancial markets and institutions impede economic efªciency, economic growth, and risk management, making East Asia more vulnerable to adverse economic and ªnancial shocks. Financial weakness and fragmentation mean that the region lacks international inºuence and remains reactive rather than proactive to international market and policy developments. The current state of East Asia's ªnancial markets, institutions, and integration offers many opportunities for signiªcant improvement and deepening.
Capital ºows and cross-border banking
The ªnancial crises in 1997 and 1998 led to a tumultuous shift in gross and net capital ºows to East Asia that still persists in 2002. Figure 1 shows the net private capital ºows to the ªve crisis-affected emerging East Asian economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand). Reºecting their current account surpluses, these ªve countries are net providers of international capital. Although foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investment ºow into these countries on a net basis, they are still paying back cross-border loans. As shown in ªgure 2, other emerging East Asian economies are also paying back international loans, but in these cases the inward portfolio investment is sufªciently large that it dominates these net outºows and makes these countries net importers of international capital.
The net repayment of loans is also seen in the cross-border assets of banks that report to the BIS. Table 1 shows exchange rate-adjusted changes in banks' crossborder loans in selected East Asian economies. There are three points to note. First, the decrease in cross-border loans has been drastic: about US$220 billion has been pulled out of these economies in the past ªve years: US$76 billion from Thailand, US$47 billion from South Korea, and US$42 billion from China (accelerated by the International Trade and Investment Corporation collapses in 1999). Most of the decrease is attributable to the collapse of loans from Japan, which was the main credi- tor to emerging East Asia (ªgures 3 and 4). Japanese banks cut back most aggressively in all the crisis-affected economies, but the cuts were particularly severe in Thailand (ªgure 5), part of a broader pattern of decline of Japanese banks in international ªnance (BIS 2002b) .
Second, the rate of decline in cross-border loans to emerging East Asia appears to be decreasing. Loans to the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan actually increased in the ªrst three quarters of 2001, and the rate of decline is slowing for the other countries, with the possible exception of Indonesia, which remains subject to substantial political uncertainty.
Third, China and South Korea are the main recipients of loans. Japanese banks now have more cross-border loans in China than in any other country elsewhere in emerging East Asia (ªgure 5). The value of these loans is now increasing, perhaps reºecting the growing importance of China as a destination for Japanese and other foreign capital; ASEAN faces a serious challenge from China in attracting not only FDI and portfolio investment, but also bank-intermediated ªnance.
The quality of infrastructure
The development of ªnancial markets rests on providing a well-functioning infrastructure. The quality of infrastructure can be judged by several key factors: an effective legal framework, reliable accounting and disclosure standards, an efªcient and reliable clearing and settlement process, and reliable and easily accessible information. Herring and Chatusripitak (2000) assessed countries by the quality of their ªnancial infrastructure, creditor rights, judicial systems, and information systems, and their results are reproduced in table 2.
The differences between markets are striking. The four developed East Asian markets, those of Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong SAR, and Australia, stand out as the high-quality markets, with the quality of infrastructure in Australia and Japan on a par with that of the U.K. and U.S. ªnancial markets. Singapore is disadvantaged by its relative lack of freedom of access to information. The developing East Asian markets as a whole are substantially below developed-market quality, and there are three clear sets: Taiwan stands at the top (and is not so different from Singapore), followed by South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand in the middle, and the Philippines and Indonesia at the bottom. Malaysia stands out in terms of lack of corruption and the strength of its accounting standards, Taiwan in terms of contract realization and the rule of law, and South Korea in terms of the quality of its bureaucracy. First, there are microstructural differences between East Asian equity markets and those elsewhere, especially in terms of size, number of stocks, extent of foreign listings, and trading hours (table 3) . The U.S., Japanese, and U.K. markets are the largest in terms of capitalization, number of listed stocks, and market turnover. The Malaysian, Indonesian, Taiwanese, and Thai markets tend to be at the lower end of the spectrum. The investor base is narrow in the equity markets of most economies in East Asia. These economies are associated with restricted and highly regulated contractual savings systems, underdeveloped mutual funds, a highly regulated asset management industry, and a limited role for insurance companies in capital markets. U.S. and U.K. markets have higher proportions of listed foreign stocks, Japan has a substantially lower share of foreign stocks, and Singapore has a very high share. Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Thailand have either no foreign listings or virtually no foreign listings. The markets also have diverse sectoral weightings, which do not seem to be related to geography or level of development.
Developments in ªnancial markets
There are substantive areas of similarity in the formation of equity prices in all the economies assessed. For example, intra-day trading patterns exist in all markets, especially the standard intra-day U-shape in absolute or squared returns and lunchtime effects. Markets around the world share these characteristics, as do those in East Asia. There is also no consistent difference in the variance properties between East Asian and other equity markets.
Second, there seem to be two key differences between East Asian and U.S./U.K. equity markets. One is that the market-opening impact on equity prices is relatively larger in East Asian equity markets; East Asian equity prices are more volatile at the start of the trading day than those in the United States or United Kingdom. This could be because they are open for fewer trading hours, or it may be because so much of the global price action that matters to equity markets occurs in New York and London, and all this information needs to be incorporated into domestic equity prices. If this is so, this difference is likely to persist and should not be an issue of concern for policymakers.
The other key difference is in the level of relative market efªciency. The weak-form test of market efªciency (testing whether past returns contain information about current and future movements in returns) does not hold in any equity market on high-frequency data such as ªve-minute returns. 1 But past information matters considerably less for the large U.S. and U.K. markets than for equity markets in East Asia. At one extreme, for example, information beyond one hour is irrelevant for the U.S. Dow, the U. with the other East Asian equity markets lying somewhere in between. For the Australia Stock Exchange, Indonesian Stock Exchange, Japan's Nikkei 225, and the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, two previous days' returns help explain current ªve-minute returns of the stock price index. For Thai stocks, the previous three days matter; for Taiwanese stocks, four days matter. There is clearly room for development in East Asian equity markets: longer trading hours, more foreign listings, and wider participation in stock markets would likely increase the speed with which new information is incorporated into equity prices. The relative lack of efªciency in East Asian equity prices is an issue for policymakers.
Foreign-exchange markets Almost a quarter of the world's foreign-exchange market activity takes place in East Asia, but this is highly concentrated in the regional ªnancial centers of Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong SAR, and Australia (table  4) . 2 Most trading in Hong Kong SAR and Singapore is in G-3 currencies, not local currencies. A notable feature of these markets is a decline in the number of ªrms doing foreign-exchange business (although this is also characteristic of other foreign-exchange markets, such as that in the United States), which reºects narrowing margins, increased competition, and the global consolidation of ªnancial institutions. In general, the concentration of activity has increased, and the number of players in the markets has declined, in some cases very substantially (table 5) .
Japan has the most foreign-exchange market activity in East Asia, but this does not mean that much of the trading activity in the region is done directly in the yen. Dollar-yen exchanges are the second-most-common transaction in foreign-exchange markets after dollar-euro exchanges. 3 Few direct trades are made between local East Asian currencies and the yen. As shown in table 6, local East Asian currency trade with the yen is largely conducted indirectly through local currency-dollar and dollar-yen trades (and vice versa). A minuscule 0.3 percent of local-currency foreignexchange transactions in East Asian countries are completed with the yen as the direct counterpart. Direct trade with the euro is 10 times this ªgure. For Southeast Asia, the value of direct yen foreign-currency trade has fallen since 1998.
Bond markets
With a few exceptions (Australia, Malaysia, South Korea, and Japan), bond markets in East Asia, especially corporate bond markets, are weak and 63
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Financial Markets, Institutions, and Integration poorly developed. The development of government bond markets depends on the degree to which institutions, such as banks, insurance companies, and pension funds, are forced to acquire bonds and thereby ªnance government spending or obligations. Generally, forced acquisition of government securities retards market development because it hinders the growth of secondary markets.
The development of viable corporate bond markets depends on three factors. First, it requires getting the basic infrastructure right so that ªrms and ªnancial markets will operate effectively. The second requirement is to strengthen the banking system, because banks are not only the major investors, guarantors, and underwriters, but Taiwan  -24  20  --49  53  Thailand  -12  11  --33  35  Reference  -------United States  20  20  13  180  130  93  79 Source: BIS (1996 BIS ( , 1999 BIS ( , 2002a .
Financial Markets, Institutions, and Integration also the major issuers, of corporate bonds. 4 The third requirement is a trigger for the development of a corporate bond market. In Australia's case, the trigger for market development has been the strong growth in demand for ªxed-interest securities, which was driven by the rapid expansion of the funds management industry (attributable to Australia's compulsory long-term savings scheme) and the contraction of the government bond market (Battelino 1999) . In Singapore's case, the trigger consisted of the easing of Monetary Authority of Singapore Notice 757 to allow nonresidents to access the market and introducing tax incentives for buying corporate bonds (see Ngiam 2002) . No one trigger will be effective for all economies in the region.
The Australian experience raises the question of whether a government bond market is always necessary for a corporate bond market to prosper. The standard view is that deep, liquid government securities markets are essential for the development of private bond markets. This is most likely true for a bond market to start, but not necessarily true for a market to continue. Although government debt has provided a benchmark for risk-free paper in Australia, the AAA-rated corporate paper market may now be deep enough to set its own benchmark. Increased demand for ªxed-interest exposures has also led to the expansion of credit risks, pushing the market out beyond AAA-rated to even BBB-rated corporate paper, so there is an increasing and ongoing market-based differentiation of risk. The growth of Australia's bond market also raises the question of whether tax beneªts are necessary in the long term to grow a domestic corporate debt market. Tax beneªts are a subsidy to ªrms and thus should increase the market. They may be a useful way to ignite a market, but tax breaks for business are also a cost and distortion to households. The Australian experience shows that corporate bond markets can develop very well without tax subsidies.
Two other issues are raised in discussions of East Asian bond markets. The ªrst is "original sin," a term Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) use to refer to the inability of a country to borrow from nonresidents in its own currency. They relate this idea of original sin to a variety of country characteristics, including sovereign risk, a history of inºation and depreciation, and a narrow investor base. The term is often regarded as a helpful notion that points to fundamental problems; it is certainly a smart tag. Only two countries in East Asia (Australia and Japan) borrow from nonresidents in their own currency to any signiªcant degree. It is important to recall, however, that the notion of original sin was developed to explain a Latin American phenomenon. Latin America's legacy comprises political instability, military dictatorships, and cycles of major economic collapse for the past century or longer. Latin America is synonymous with instability, so it is not surprising that countries in this region do not borrow in their own currency from foreigners-they cannot. Latin America is not afºicted by original sin as much as it suffers from the sins of its past.
East Asia, however, is hardly in the same league as Latin America. It certainly has had its share of political instability, corruption, and economic shocks, but these problems have not been widespread and currently tend to be concentrated in a few countries. Few East Asian countries have a history of inºation or problems with the management of government debt. There are very few incidences of government debt default in the region, and none occurred during the East Asian ªnancial crisis. Most market-based countries in the region are relatively balanced and well managed, the East Asian ªnancial crisis notwithstanding. Based on all these factors, the only countries in East Asia that a reasonable investor would be really wary of are Indonesia and the Philippines.
So why have East Asian countries not been borrowing in their own currencies from foreigners? The ªrst reason is that governments have not needed to borrow because they have kept their books balanced. Second, and more importantly, East Asian governments have not wanted to engage in such borrowing because they have been fearful of creating exposures to foreigners and losing control over the market. Borrowing from foreigners means giving up some control, and borrowing in one's own currency means giving up even more control and potentially exposing one's currency to the vagaries of foreign demand. Thus the original-sin hypothesis may be an appropriate conjecture for Latin America, but not for most of East Asia (see Ngiam 2002) .
The second issue raised in discussions of East Asian bond markets is the development of an integrated East Asian regional bond market. At present, countries in the region issue international public sector and sovereign bonds in the European and U.S., not the Asian, markets. The issue by foreigners of yen-denominated (Samurai) or foreign-currency-denominated (Shogun) bonds in Tokyo is negligible. The Asian markets are not attractive because they lack the right institutional infrastructure and do not have sufªcient depth and liquidity.
Three additional problems need to be resolved before a regional bond market can develop. First, there is the issue of currency exposure: issuing in a foreign currency may create unwanted foreign-currency exposures, especially in a regional currency for which there is limited scope for managing risk. The only regional currencies that offer sufªcient hedging instruments (i.e., swaps, forwards, and options) are the yen and the Australian dollar, which are, respectively, the third-and seventh-mosttraded currencies in the world.
Second, there is the issue of support for ªnancial innovation in East Asia. A deep and liquid East Asian bond market will develop only if the region is prepared to embrace deregulated and liberalized ªnancial markets. This means that East Asian countries will have to accept greater internationalization of their currencies and accept speculation in ªnancial markets. The former is the opposite of the trend in much of the region, and many Asian countries have an instinctive aversion toward the latter. The 1997 and 1998 ªnancial crises have left in their wake the implicit assumptions that internationalization of the currency and speculation are best avoided. The merit of these assumptions is discussed in section 2.
Finally, there is the issue of Japan. Japan is a leader in the East Asian debate on regional development and policy initiatives, including a regional bond market. Although this is welcome, there is polite questioning of, and confusion about, Japan's motives in the region. 5 Is Japan arguing for a regional bond market because it thinks this is the best way to promote a stable development in emerging East Asia? Or is it a way to promote the status of the yen and Japan and to cement Japan's place at the center of regional arrangements ahead of the expected rise of China? Some observers claim that Japan expresses some strong rhetoric about an East Asian regional bond market but does little in practice: it has a mixed record of supporting competition by foreign ªnancial institutions in Japan and has not provided the right sort of institutional infrastructure and arrangements to support wide participation, and strong secondary markets, in its own bond market (Asian Policy Forum 2001).
Derivatives markets Derivatives (including swaps, forwards, and options) are an essential part of risk management for ªrms, ªnancial institutions, and governments. Table 7 provides a snapshot of the depth of the derivatives markets in East Asia. As for foreign-exchange trading, derivatives trading is concentrated in the region's ªnancial centers (Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong SAR, and Australia). Over-thecounter (OTC) derivatives trading elsewhere in the region is negligible and reºects the limited ability of ªrms and households to manage ªnancial risk. The region largely holds its own in terms of foreign-exchange derivatives: East Asia's share of foreign-exchange derivatives was about 24 percent in April 2001, on par with its share of world foreign-exchange trading. These derivatives are mostly based on the dollar, yen, and euro rather than on regional currencies. East Asia is particularly weak when it comes to interest rate derivatives, with only 4.7 percent of the world market. These derivatives are simple: only 6 percent are options and the rest are swaps (68 percent) and forwards (26 percent). They are largely concentrated in U.S. dollar interest rates; yen interest rate derivatives have been declining. There is a striking difference between regional ªnancial centers in this regard, with Australia standing out in relative strength (ªgure 6). The general implication from the low level of activity in domestic-currency and interest rate derivatives is that East Asia is poorly developed in its ªnancial risk management. 
Financial reform

Four important issues
Harmonizing markets
Much of the focus on ªnance in East Asia since the crises of 1997 and 1998 has been on institutional development, particularly the repair of the banking and supervisory systems of many of the crisis-affected economies (and other East Asian economies). The ability of the region to attract international funds and ªnancial expertise is being adversely affected by changes elsewhere in the world. The introduction of the euro is having a substantial effect on the development, structure, and integration of ªnancial regulations, instruments, and institutions in the euro area; for example, the consolidation of trading, clearing, and settlement in the European Union is expected to reduce clearing and settlement costs by around US$1 billion a year (Sheng 2001) . The Americas are dominated by the U.S. dollar and U.S. regulations and market practices. Many institutions in the Americas are dollarized and follow U.S. standards, even if they are outside the United States.
East Asian ªnancial markets are segmented and poorly integrated. The markets that are relatively highly controlled and closed are relatively small, inefªcient, and lack innovation. Financial market harmonization will not be an easy process. Practical ways to strengthen ªnancial markets include working toward a greater acceptance of a market mentality, balancing regional ambitions with the global orientation of ªnance, and widening market access. These goals can be met in a manner that suits the market structure of East Asia. Four relatively strong centers of ªnance in East Asia are Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong SAR, and Australia ("the Four"). The challenge is to integrate these markets, at the same time using this structure to develop and integrate the other markets in the region.
This process is in train in several respects. The Four Markets Meeting addresses issues of common interest to policymakers in ªnancial markets in Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong SAR, and Australia, and although its membership is relatively small, it is regarded as an effective forum for policy dialogue. EMEAP (Executive Meeting of East Asia Paciªc) serves to bring regional central bank governors and ofªcials together, and its working groups on foreign-exchange markets, payments systems, and bank supervision are constructive and well regarded. The Singaporean stock ex-change has bilateral agreements with the Australian and Japanese stock exchanges to allow investors to use their local exchange to access and buy stocks on the other exchange, with their local exchange acting as intermediary and trustee.
The integration of regional ªnancial markets will require complex changes, not the least of which will be the simpliªcation and harmonization of listing and licensing requirements, accounting standards, settlement and clearance procedures, and taxation. If it is not possible to adopt common standards, practices, and regulatory frameworks, it may be possible to work toward mutual recognition, similar to the initial approach in ªnancial integration in Europe. This is more easily done with economies that have respected and trusted regulatory frameworks. Difªculties associated with achieving mutual recognition will not be conªned to those between the more-developed and less-developed ªnancial markets in the region. Integration and mutual recognition may be more easily accomplished between Australia, Singapore, and Hong Kong SAR than between these three economies and Japan.
Japan is an outlier for several reasons. As a legacy of the U.S. occupation after World War II, Japan's securities law is based on that of the United States. As a legacy of their colonial past, the economies of Australia, Singapore, and Hong Kong SAR have legal systems based on British common law. These differences may affect the integration process with respect to achieving stock market linkages. Japanese securities law (like that in the United States) prohibits foreign securities from being offered locally unless they are registered, and registration is an involved process akin to listing on the local exchange. Thus Singaporeans can invest in Japanese stocks but, unless there is reform of the securities law, Japanese cannot invest in Singaporean stocks. No such regulatory impediment exists between Australia, Singapore, and Hong Kong SAR (or Malaysia for that matter).
Japan's markets are clearly much larger than those in Australia, Hong Kong SAR, and Singapore, but they are also less sophisticated: for example, over-the-counter and exchange-based ªnancial transactions are more likely to be paper-based than electronic. Oddly, for such a major technology provider, Japan still requires some ªnancial transactions to be documented in paper. The stock exchanges in the three smaller ªnancial centers have been demutualized for a fairly long time; in contrast, the Tokyo Stock Exchange did so only at the end of 2001. Market participants perceive Japanese ªnancial markets to be unusually opaque for such a major market, in the sense that the authorities are thought to be more likely to intervene in stock and bond markets through "price-keeping operations," and that certain market participants (notoriously, the Japanese brokerage houses) may try to manipulate the market for commercial or political gain.
Japan's markets will not be an appealing role model in the region as long as price formation appears to be unclear and not market-based. Market estimates of banks' NPLs and of the technical insolvency of the insurance sector are invariably higher than those published by the Japanese authorities. The authorities appear to think that understating the numbers is an indication of ofªcial conªdence in the system. The opposite is usually true; from the viewpoint of depositors and investors, the credibility of the authorities is damaged even more by such understatements. Although no market or regulatory regime is perfect, the general view is that the Australian, Hong Kong SAR, and Singaporean markets and regimes are "cleaner" and healthier than those of Japan. This perception would matter much less if Japan had a strong and robust ªnancial sector and economy, but it does not. In the past decade it has suffered four recessions, and its banking and ªnancial systems are in a mess.
Japan leads the region in its calls for functional cooperation and integration, especially in ªnance. This is welcome. But its capacity to lead is hamstrung by the weakness of its ªnancial institutions and markets. The structure and operation of its legal process make it an outlier, at least for Southeast Asia. This poses an important challenge for Japan as the region ponders the way forward in ªnancial integration. Should the ªnancial markets in Japan become more like the other three developed ªnancial markets in East Asia, or should they conform to Japanese best practices? Australia, Hong Kong SAR, and Singapore will not converge on Japan because, for the reasons stated above, that would damage their well-being and economic interests. In addition, Japan offers a weaker role model than that provided by these smaller developed countries for the developing ªnancial markets of East Asia. Although Japan will remain at the heart of East Asian ªnancial integration for the next few decades, its importance is likely to diminish under its current policy regime.
A market mentality
In order to have ªnancial markets support stable economic growth, policymakers need to adopt pro-market policies. In particular, they need to overcome a popular and widespread aversion to speculation. The ªnancial crises in 1997 and 1998 left many policymakers in the region with the view that speculation and hedge funds are destabilizing. Enough evidence and analysis now exists to enable one to conclude with conªdence that serious bouts of destabilizing speculation during 1997 and 1998 in East Asia and South Africa substantially raised the economic and social cost of the crises (FSF 2000; de Brouwer 2001) . This is not to say that the crises were caused (only) by speculators. The crises and their depth had many causes, and serious policy mistakes by national and international policymakers in most countries compounded the costs of the crises.
Destabilizing speculation was fed by the activities of large inºuential players, especially a handful of the macro hedge funds, and by manipulative behavior by a range of highly leveraged institutions, including the macro hedge funds and the proprietary trading desks of international investment banks and securities companies (Rankin 1999; Yam 1999; de Brouwer 2001 ). This conclusion is consistent with a large theoretical and empirical literature that regards overshooting and herding as intrinsic characteristics of ªnancial markets (Cutler, Poterba, and Summers 1990; De Long et al. 1990; Devenow and Welch 1996; de Brouwer 2001) .
It would be a mistake, however, to think that all, or even most, speculation is destabilizing. The events of 1997 and 1998 were relatively unusual. Speculation is fundamental to risk management and is the lifeblood of ªnancial markets. Unless a person who wants to hedge an exposure ªnds another would-be hedger with identical but opposite preferences, then the only way to hedge risk is to ªnd a speculator who is willing to bear that risk. The concern should not be speculation per se (indeed, speculation should be encouraged in order to provide depth and liquidity to markets); rather, the problem should be seen as how to deal with the conditions that give rise to destabilizing speculation, such as deep information asymmetries; market power; action-, information-, and trade-based manipulation; and weak fundamentals.
The idea of encouraging hedge funds sends shivers down the backs of most policymakers in East Asia. It is important to recall, however, that the highly leveraged institutions that caused some of the problems in 1997 and 1998 were but a handful of macro hedge funds and a handful of proprietary trading desks at some of the U.S. and European investment banks and securities companies (mostly in their Singapore and New York branches). 6 There are thousands of hedge funds and, as a class, they are important providers of innovation, liquidity, and efªciency in markets. If East Asian ªnancial markets are ever to develop and deepen, policymakers have no choice but to promote speculation, including hedge funds.
There are ways to deal with the rogue elements that were apparent in 1997 and 1998. 7 One strategy that has become popular in some emerging East Asian markets is to limit the ability of nonresident speculators to access funding in the swaps market, in order to limit selling pressures in foreign-exchange markets. Brouwer (2001) . My discussion follows the arguments in that book.
7 These include binding codes of conduct in foreign-exchange markets to limit manipulation, proper margining requirements for hedge funds, disclosure of aggregate positions, and regulation of electronic brokerage transactions (de Brouwer 2001) .
are required for this to work. First, the authorities have to be in a position to enforce the regulations. Second, the currency in question must not be "internationalized": restricting the access of nonresidents to swap ªnancing in the domestic market works only as long as there is not a substantial offshore market in the currency. The clearest examples are Malaysia and Taiwan. In Malaysia, the authorities restricted swap access to fund short ringgit positions in the domestic market in August 1997, but this did not curtail speculative positioning because a large liquid offshore ringgit market existed in Singapore. Offshore speculation stopped only when the authorities closed off the access of this market to the domestic Malaysian banking system in September 1998. In Taiwan, the authorities imposed swap limits on nonresidents in September 1997, and this was effective because there was no offshore market in the new Taiwan dollar.
Although any government can impose limits on borrowing in the swaps market, not every government has the will or institutional capacity to enforce them. Looking at East Asia, it is hard to argue that many countries are in a position to enforce such limits. South Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore certainly can, and Thailand probably can, but it is hard to imagine that porous economies with weak regulatory structures and enforcement processes, such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and southern coastal China, could successfully implement such limits.
Limiting the access of nonresidents to the domestic swaps market can be an effective tool in limiting offshore speculation, but it does not protect against many forms of domestic speculation. It is worth remembering that this is the more usual type of speculation. In addition, such limiting of access potentially imposes other serious costs on the economy because it makes it harder to manage risk, which makes the economy more vulnerable to shocks. When there is an offshore market in a currency, residents (essentially farmers, ªrms, and banks) can hedge their exposures, and offshore parties bear the risk. This is the case for Australia and New Zealand, both of which have internationalized currencies (especially Australia) but were able to deal with big negative external shocks and exchange rate movements in the East Asian ªnancial crises without adverse balance sheet effects in their corporate or ªnancial sectors. Although internationalizing the currency may create new risks, it also makes the economy more adept at dealing with risk. Considering the poor development of derivatives markets in East Asia generally, a fundamental weakness exists in the region's ability to manage risk.
Regional versus global markets
Regionalist sentiment in East Asia has been growing, motivated by a range of economic, strategic, and chauvinistic or emotional factors that have centered around disillusion with international processes and the actions (or inaction) of the United States during the ªnancial crisis. From an economic perspective, there are both constructive and destructive elements to this regionalist stance. Regionalism may have two main negative consequences. One is that East Asian regionalism may take an inward-looking, insular, and chauvinistic form. Such attitudes are evident in the way in which some parts of the region deal with identity, both nationally and regionally, including the degree to which the region (or parts of it) perceives Australia and New Zealand as natural participants in East Asian regional dialogue and cooperation. 8 The fact is that there is no homogeneous East Asian identity (be it racial, social, or religious), just as there is none for Europe or the Americas, but there are shared geographic, economic, and strategic interests. Concerns about insularity are likely to be exaggerated, however, because the region's primary economic and strategic interests are global; regional integration will tend to be kept within the perspective of countries' broader interests.
The other potential negative consequence of regionalism is that it may lead to rules and mechanisms that may weaken (or be weaker than) global rules and mechanisms. The efªciencies from ªnancial integration and common rules and processes are probably greatest at the global level. This suggests that the "natural" place to discuss and negotiate the ªnancial infrastructure is in international forums, not regional forums. However, even if an international forum is the preferred arena, it does not follow that regional ªnancial arrangements have no purpose. They can play a crucial part in global integration by promoting ªnancial development, of which East Asia is sorely in need. As outlined above, the two-tiered development of East Asian ªnancial markets indicates that there is a strong case for harmonizing the four well-developed markets and using cooperation as a basis for building capacity in the less well-developed ªnancial markets of the region.
Regional ªnancial cooperation and integration will also provide East Asia with a stronger voice in global forums and greater inºuence in global policymaking. Sheng (2001) and Grenville (2002) believe that the OECD and EU Commission are good regional institutional forums because they have expert secretariats to provide background analysis for policymakers on particular issues. Unlike other institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, they embody the principle of subsidiarity: the member states are the decision makers, not the institutions themselves.
The potential to inºuence global standards and rules provides a strong motivation for enhanced policy cooperation and ªnancial market development in East Asia. A 76 Asian Economic Papers Financial Markets, Institutions, and Integration strong case can be made for strengthening the region's policy infrastructure, which would entail including all the region's ªnancial centers. Currently, Australia and Hong Kong SAR take part in the regional debate that occurs within the Four Markets Meeting and EMEAP meetings but not that which occurs within the ASEANϩ3 framework. ASEANϩ3 is a positive and welcome advance in constructing a regional policy framework, but its narrow membership will limit its potential to deliver as a regional mechanism for promoting ªnancial development and integration in East Asia.
More market players
Markets will remain narrow if there are too few participants. The less-efªcient equity markets in the region are the ones with the most limited trading and the tightest limits on access by nonresidents or foreigners. Financial systems in most of East Asia are bank-based. There is substantial scope for expanding the range of domestic institutions, including local institutional investors. There is also scope to make wider use of foreign ªnancial and human capital in developing regional markets. Foreign ªrms are an important conduit for the transfer of ªnancial skill and technology. It does not mean that they should be allowed unfettered access to a market. Solid supervision and market-consistent regulation are essential.
Conclusion
The overall state of ªnancial markets in East Asia is not very pretty. East Asian ªnancial markets are tiered: the developed markets of the region (Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong SAR, and Australia) perform well by international standards; most of the others (South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand) are average but provide a narrow product base; and a few (China, Indonesia, and the Philippines) have a long way to go. Infrastructure and risk management in the region are generally at low levels by international standards. Continued weakness in Japan's ªnancial institutions, market structure, and economy are diminishing its importance and impeding regional development.
There is a need to harmonize markets in East Asia, as a complement to institutional development. Relative to the Americas and Europe, East Asian ªnancial markets are increasingly fractured. Japan faces special challenges with respect to harmonization because its regulatory structure has different legal origins, and its institutions and markets, while bigger, are structurally weaker and less efªcient than the other developed markets in the region. This may mean that Japan is not the natural focus for ªnancial integration in East Asia, especially in Southeast Asia, even though it is a major player.
The growth of ªnancial markets depends on having market-friendly systems, infrastructure, and mechanisms. The challenge for policymakers is not just to accept, but to nurture, speculation, because it is necessary for proper risk management. Encouraging speculation and developing derivatives markets, however, may create exposure to other risks, including the possibility of destabilizing speculation, and so effective regulatory systems need to be in place to deal with this. Depending on the economy, such regulation may or may not involve setting swap limits on offshore speculators and limiting the international use of the domestic currency.
The rise of regionalist sentiment and policymaking in East Asia has both potentially destructive and potentially constructive elements. One disadvantage of such sentiment and policymaking is that it can lead to insularity and a weakening of global rules and mechanisms; however, these are unlikely eventualities in East Asia. Regionalist action in the ªnance domain is, on balance, more likely to provide beneªts, such as better policy dialogue, deeper cooperation, and ªnancial development. It may also boost the region's global inºuence, although whether this actually occurs will largely depend on whether East Asia keeps its regional focus outward-looking.
Clearly, the deepening of ªnancial markets in East Asia requires more market players. This entails expanding the range of ªnancial institutions, such as institutional investors, to balance the high bank concentration in East Asian ªnancial systems. It also means that domestic systems need to accept more foreigners and foreign institutions from within and without the region.
An action agenda for regional cooperation needs to be formulated. The economies with relatively more developed ªnancial markets need to work harder to integrate their ªnancial markets and systems. This is a particular challenge for Japan, which is beset by institutional weaknesses. These more developed economies also need to cooperate more closely with the rest of the region to build up ofªcial and private ªnancial capacity in East Asia. Regional ªnancial integration may prove to be a more fruitful program than regional trade integration.
